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Abstract 
In recent years, foreign investors have taken advantage of loopholes in European taxation 
systems in order to avoid paying taxes on dividends and to steal from the public treasury for 
their own benefit. This has happened through extensive stock lending/trading around ex-
dividend dates in many European countries for the last decade and our theory is that it is still 
happening. In this thesis we are primarily looking at tax-motivated trading such as cum-
cum/cum-ex trading in Scandinavia. 
The tax-motivated trading schemes involves extensive stock lending and transfer of shares 
before the ex-dividend date from investors with a high marginal tax rate, to investors with a 
lower marginal tax rate. The saved tax is usually split among the participants in the scheme. 
This scheme is not necessarily strictly illegal, however, if investors can lend out their stocks 
with the purpose of avoiding taxes, it could be a sign that the taxation laws are not working as 
supposed.  
In this thesis we investigate how the short ratio behaves for the largest publicly traded stocks 
in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. We are interested in changes around the ex-dividend date 
and how the short ratio has changed in the said countries after Denmark changed their 
regulation in 2016. Next, we look to see if dividend yield can explain the differences in the 
short ratio. Finally, we give an estimate on the tax loss in 2018 for the largest stocks in Sweden 
and Norway. 
We find that short ratio increases significantly in a seven-day window around the ex-dividend 
date in said countries. Additionally, we find that short-selling in Denmark is significantly 
reduced in the period after the regulation was introduced. Whether this is due to the regulation 
itself or other factors is hard to determine, but the effect is isolated to Denmark. We find that 
short-selling is higher for stocks in the highest dividend yield group, but we cannot say that 
the increased short ratio is directly linked to the increase in dividend yield for all dividend 
yield groups. Whether the increased short-selling is due to tax-motivated trading or other 
factors, such as dividend capture trading, is hard to conclude on but we argue that a substantial 
part of the short-selling is likely tax-motivated.  
Finally, we argue that Norway and Sweden could be prone to revenue tax losses up to NOK 
675 million and SEK 754 million, respectively for the year 2018. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Tax fraud and tax avoidance in Europe has sparked attention over the last few years due to 
revelations by several sources, most notably CumEx-files, that have shed light on how 
European taxpayers have been swindled for billions of euros through cum-ex and cum-cum 
trading schemes (CumEx-files, 2018). The Danish newspaper DR has calculated the amount 
of tax losses due to tax-motivated trading schemes to 12,7 billion DKK between the years of 
2012 to 2015 in Denmark (DR, 2018a). Equivalent numbers for Norway and Sweden have not 
been identified and will be attempted in this thesis. The CumEx-files exposed tax schemes 
involving taxes on dividend payments and was a collaboration between almost 19 European 
media outlets. It revealed the biggest tax swindle in Europe in its history and totaled up to an 
amount of 55,2 billion euros. The players in this tax scheme involved, among others, American 
pension funds and European banks. The most notable tax schemes involved stealing from 
European countries (cum-ex) and avoiding dividend tax (cum-cum) (CumEx-files, 2018).   
1.2 Purpose of the research 
The CumEx-files showed that cum-ex and cum-cum activities in Denmark were considerably 
large and Denmark has since done changes to their systems to counter tax-motivated trading 
schemes. Countries such as Sweden and Norway were also mentioned in the CumEx-files but 
did not get the same attention and estimations for potential tax loss as Denmark. Our thesis 
will, by using short data1 as a proxy, try to identify tax-motivated trading in these countries.  
Most of the literature on tax-motivated trading, especially cum-cum and cum-ex, is centered 
around Germany. We extend the literature on a country-level by focusing on the Scandinavian 
countries. The motivation for this is to see how tax-motivated trading affects markets in the 
Scandinavian countries. Further, a positive correlation between trust and levels of tax can be 
found for the Scandinavian countries and levels of trust are the highest in the world in this 
region (Kleven, 2014). It is therefore interesting to look at the impact of tax-motivated trading 
 
1 Short interest as a percentage of free float. Note that we also use the term ‘short ratio’ which denotes the same.  
 7 
for the Scandinavian countries. Trust does not automatically indicate naivety, but if the 
Scandinavian countries are under the expectation that tax-motivated trading does not happen 
in their countries, their regulations would probably not be set to prevent this type of trading 
either.  
In general, there is limited literature on cum-ex and cum-cum trading and we will seek to 
contribute by clarifying the differences between the trading schemes. Most of the cum-ex 
trading exposed in the CumEx-files was centered around loopholes and by creating arbitrary 
transactions and apply for multiple refunds for the same dividend. While CumEx-files and the 
attention it brought may have reduced the cum-ex trading, we speculate that cum-cum 
transactions is still apparent. Cum-ex transactions exploits the settlement period for share 
transactions, that stock trades are not settled immediately, to create an illusion that there are 
multiple owners of a stock. Cum-cum transactions, on the other hand, can be centered around 
a wider window since the basic requirement is that the owner of the shares have switched 
hands before the ex-dividend date. In this thesis the primary focus will revolve around cum-
cum trading. 
The main purpose of our thesis was to identify if there are patterns in the short-selling activity 
that can indicate tax-motivated trading and how much that can be attributed to cum-cum. We 
use short-selling as a proxy for tax-motivated trading since it has been identified as the 
dominant method to execute different tax-avoidance schemes (Spengel, 2016). In previous 
research, trading volume has been used as a proxy, but we expect short-selling to come to 
better use, as this is the dominant way cum-cum has been executed. Tax schemes, such as 
cum-cum and cum-ex, are reliant on a change in the beneficial owner before the ex-dividend 
date, which can be done through short-selling or securities lending. By studying how short-
selling fluctuates around ex-dividend dates, we can try to identify and estimate the amount of 
tax-motivated trading. This method extends the literature on tax-motivated trading by using 
other types of data, such as short-selling data, to identify abnormal patterns around the ex-
dividend dates.  
Since short-selling is typically done as a bet on a stock’s price fall, we expect that the cum-
cum effect will be on top of regular short-selling. In a market where there are no taxes on 
dividends and marginal taxes for different investors are similar, there would be no reason to 
trade in a tax-motivated manner but there would still be regular short-selling. 
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The tax-motivated cum-cum trading will increase the total amount of shares that are short-sold 
or on loan. Possible confounders for increased short-selling around ex-dividend dates are 
described by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986). One of the factors they describe as reason 
for increased short-selling volume around ex-dividend dates is dividend capture trading. They 
explain that stocks are traded above their fundamental value before ex-dividend dates and this 
provides an opportunity for short-sellers to gain on (Lakonishok and Vermalen, 1986). If a 
stock revert to its fundamental value after the dividend has been paid, the stock is overvalued 
at the ex-dividend date and we expect to see the stock price fall back to the fundamental value 
after the dividend payment. This provides an attractive trade for short-sellers as they gain when 
the stock price falls.   
To further corner the effect we are looking for, we can use the following method; for similar 
stocks in different countries whereas one of the countries “allow” for cum-cum we expect to 
see a higher short-selling in the country that “allows” for cum-cum. By comparing, we can 
potentially identify the cum-cum effect. As Denmark has tightened regulation, they can be a 
good indicator to see if cum-cum is present in Norway and Sweden. This will contribute to the 
limited literature of cum-cum by providing insight into short-selling and tax-motivated trading 
in Scandinavia.  
Our thesis also provides insight into which stocks that are more prone to be traded in a tax-
motivated manner. For cum-cum trading to be worthwhile, the transactional cost has to be 
lower than the gain from the scheme. Our theory is therefore that stocks with larger dividend 
yields will be more shorted around ex-dividend date than stocks with lower yields. Our thesis 
gives insight if this pattern stems to be true or not. Based on this, we have formulated two 
research questions that we will elaborate on later: 
1) Does the short data for the Scandinavian countries, from 2013 till today, show any 
abnormal trading patterns that could indicate tax-motivated trading? 
 
2) Does the short data indicate that stocks with a higher dividend yield have more tax-
motivated trading, than stocks with a lower dividend yield?  
Our findings suggest that short-selling increases significantly around the ex-dividend date for 
the Scandinavian countries. We find that the short-selling in Denmark has decreased after their 
regulatory changes and the discovery of the cum-ex and cum-cum trades there. The same 
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decrease cannot be found for Norway and Sweden. Further, we find that short-selling is most 
prominent for stocks with highest dividend yield. For lower and medium yielding stocks, the 
results are mixed and not conclusive. Finally, we estimate the tax revenue loss for Norway and 
Sweden to be up to NOK 675 million and SEK 754 million, respectively for the year 2018.  
We contribute to the literature by showing the increased short-selling around the ex-dividend 
date, exposing reduced short-selling in Denmark after 2016 and that high yielding stocks have 
the highest short-selling among the different yield categories. At last, our tax loss analysis 
contributes to the literature by trying to estimate the presence and amount of tax-motivated 
trading (cum-cum) in Norway and Sweden. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Withholding tax 
When a dividend from a Scandinavian stock is distributed to a foreign shareholder, a tax is 
normally deducted from the amount that the shareholder receives. This tax is normally called 
a withholding tax. There is withholding tax on dividends for all the Scandinavian countries. 
For dividends paid to domestic investors in the Nordic countries, the distributed amount is 
subject to income tax.  
The laws on withholding tax in the Scandinavian countries are similar, but there are some 
important differences between the legislations. Common for Scandinavian countries is that 
companies that pay a dividend to its foreign shareholders need to deduct withholding tax on a 
set rate. The withholding tax can in turn be reduced due to an applicable tax treaty or due to 
tax-exemption rules (PWC, 2019). The exceptions are different for each country and will be 
addressed in short. Further there are different rules when it comes to natural persons or legal 
persons. In this paper the focus is primarily on corporate investors and will therefore be 
addressed in the largest content. Corporate investors will be referred to as ‘investors’ in the 
thesis and should not be mixed with individual investors as the legislation is different. 
Throughout the thesis we will use Norway as an example and will therefore start by presenting 
the legislation in this section. 
In Norway there are exemption rules to dividend taxation. The exemption method in Norway 
gives foreign corporate investors the possibility to refund the withholding tax. The company 
has to be established and have real economic activity in an EEA country. Further, the 
shareholder needs to be the beneficial dividend recipient. Entities that can claim a refund after 
the exemption method are listed under the Taxation Act section 2-38, subsection 1, letters a-
h. For a foreign shareholder to claim the refund, it needs to equal one of the Norwegian taxable 
entities listed under the act (Skatteetaten, n.d.a).  
For Sweden and Denmark, the laws are different. Swedish domestic companies do not pay 
dividend tax, but they do pay income tax on dividends. In Denmark, the dividend tax is reduced 
to 15% for domestic investment companies (Skat.dk, 2019). Similar for all Scandinavian 
countries is that they have tax-exemptions if the company owns more than 10 percent of the 
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share capital in the stock. In Sweden, the company needs to hold more than 10 percent of the 
voting shares for “business reasons” for listed shares and needs to be held for at least 1 year. 
Non-listed stocks are always considered to be held for “business reasons” and can therefore 
be tax-exempt (PWC, 2019).  
In Denmark, dividends are usually tax-exempt if the non-resident owns more than 10 percent 
of the share capital of the payer and the receiver is the beneficial owner of the stocks. This 
holds for most of the countries that Denmark has tax agreements with. If the shareholder is not 
tax-exempt, the general tax rate is 27 percent but can be reduced due to a tax agreement with 
the respective country of the shareholder. The difference between the withholding tax rate and 
the reduced rate needs to be applied for by the shareholder in order to be refunded (Skat.dk, 
2019).  
The key takeaway for the reader is that there are many tax-exemptions and tax-reduction 
possibilities in the legislations for all the three countries. The fact that the marginal tax rate 
can differ based on the residency of the company holding the stocks and what type of company 
they are, makes it possible for investors to adapt in front of the dividend payment.  
In Table 1, the general withholding taxes for the different Scandinavian countries are 
presented. The general rates are different for the countries, but they all have reduced 
withholding tax for many similar countries (exemplified with the US). We highlight the tax 
rate for US investors as American pension funds have been involved in a large number of tax-
motivated schemes such as cum-cum and cum-ex trading (New York Times, 2018).  
Table 1: Tax rate by country 
Country Withholding tax 
Norway 25% 
Sweden 30% 
Denmark 27% 
Reduction for US investor due to tax agreement 15%* 
Notes: *All Scandinavian countries have tax reduction agreement with the US. 
The tax rate presented is the general withholding tax if the company holding the 
stocks is based outside of the respective countries.   
 
Apart from the US, the Scandinavian countries have different tax agreements with foreign 
countries. This means that the marginal tax rate for different investors varies. This creates an 
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incentive where the lowest-taxed investor should own the stocks before the ex-dividend date 
to reduce tax. Equities are therefore typically “parked” in the legislation with the lowest 
marginal tax before the ex-dividend date.   
2.2 Cum-cum trading 
Cum-cum trading and cum-ex trading are often portrayed and mixed up when talking about 
the issue of dividend tax fraud and avoidance. Cum-ex trading, in the form of receiving 
multiple tax credit reimbursements, exploits flaws in the tax system. Cum-cum trading, on the 
other hand, is in a grey zone in terms of legality. As the purpose of cum-cum trading is to 
avoid paying tax on dividends, it could therefore be deemed illegitimate, while it per definition 
is legal (Spengel, 2016).  
Cum-cum trading exploits the differences in withholding tax for investors in different 
countries. As we have exemplified by Norway earlier, companies within EU/EEA that hold 
Norwegian stocks are typically tax-exempt withholding taxes on dividends while non-
EU/EEA investors have to pay withholding tax. Applicable tax treaties between countries can 
reduce the general withholding tax rate. Typically, corporate investors from outside the EEA 
have to pay a higher withholding tax on dividends from Norwegian companies, while 
corporate investors within EEA can apply for a tax credit for the withholding tax on their 
dividends. Common for all forms of cum-cum trading involves transferring ownership of the 
shares, for a period of time, from an investor that pays withholding tax to an investor that can 
apply for a tax refund. An example of a cum-cum trade is described in the next section. 
To exemplify the impact of foreign investors and why tax-motivated trading can be a problem, 
we observe the amount of foreign capital on Oslo Stock Exchange. Garsjø & Seglem (2016) 
showed in their master thesis that investors from four countries own approximately 28 percent 
of the values on the Oslo Stock Exchange2. Further, above 12 percent of the ownership on 
Oslo Stock Exchange is owned by investors from American and non-European countries. 
These countries do not have any tax exemption (some of them have tax reduction agreements) 
in Norway, and could possibly have a larger gain on tax-motivated activities as cum-cum 
 
2 These countries are the US, the UK, Luxembourg and Belgium. The total foreign ownership in 2019 is approximately 40 
percent (DN, 2019) 
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and/or cum-ex. From the CumEx-files it was addressed that a large amount of American 
pension funds was involved in the cum-ex scheme.  
2.2.1 Cum-cum in practice 
Cum-cum trading to avoid taxes can be arranged in multiple variations. The simplest form is 
a spot market transaction while other cum-cum trades can be facilitated as repurchase 
agreements/TRS agreements3, securities lending or a combination of the mentioned. As we 
have gathered short data in the Scandinavian countries, we will focus on this type of 
arrangement. This type of arrangement is also the most dominant form of cum-cum trading 
(Spengel, 2016). The cum-cum trade involves two or more parties, often a European bank. 
The bank commonly has a supporting role in facilitating the scheme (European Parliament, 
2018). An example of how the cum-cum trade scheme would work in practice in exemplified 
in Figure 14: 
 
Figure 1: Example of a cum-cum transaction 
 
  
 
3 Total return swap. For definition, see The European Commission (2013) 
4 All figures and illustrations throughout the thesis are own contributions.  
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A lender that is resident in a country with an unfavorable tax agreement with the country that 
the investor owns shares in, wants to reduce their marginal tax. In this example we can use an 
American investor and a European bank as an example. In all Scandinavian countries an 
American investor that owns shares (not above the 10% level mentioned earlier) in a publicly 
traded company pays 15% withholding tax on their dividend. If the publicly traded stock is a 
Norwegian company, a European company does not pay withholding tax to Norway (the 
exemption method mentioned earlier).  
Before the ex-dividend date, the lender transfers the ownership of the shares in the Norwegian 
company from itself to a borrower (company within the EU). When the Norwegian company 
pays out their dividend, the registered owner of the shares is the European company. The 
withholding tax will still typically be withdrawn from the dividend, but the European company 
can fully refund the withholding tax.  
At last, the shares are transferred back to the original owner. The dividend payment that the 
borrower received is usually transferred back to the lender after subtracting a fee. The rate that 
the borrower has to pay to lend the shares can also be set to match the dividend payment, to 
disguise that the transfer of shares is solely to avoid paying withholding tax.   
2.3 Cum-ex trading 
As our thesis is primarily centered around the cum-cum topic, we will only include a brief 
description of the mechanics behind cum-ex transactions. The motivation for cum-ex schemes 
is to receive several dividend tax refunds rather than avoiding tax like described under cum-
cum transactions (Spengel, 2016). Firstly, it should be noted that information about this topic 
has been limited for the public eye until after the German cum-ex scandal in 2016, and most 
of the information available is based on this event.  
Buettner et al. (2018) explores the exploitation of the withholding tax system in Germany, 
suggesting that these schemes were purposely made to circumvent the tax system and receive 
multiple tax refunds. Investors that exploited this scheme performed a set of complex 
transactions during a short time span, close to the ex-dividend date. In short, these trades 
deliberately aim to ‘blur’ which investor that has the right to claim a tax refund. This results 
in both/several investors receiving a tax certificate. It is likely to believe that similar schemes 
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have been used in other countries as well for the same purpose of receiving multiple tax 
refunds. Similar schemes have for instance been revealed in Denmark and is expected to have 
had an impact on the rest of the Scandinavian countries as well. Norway did for instance stop 
a reimbursement of 500 000 NOK based on a tip from Denmark in 2018 (DR, 2018a).  
2.4 Dividend capture trading 
While the tax schemes described above can be a potential explanation for the increased trading 
activity around the ex-dividend date, there are trading strategies that solely focus on dividend 
payments. Dividend capture trading is based on a strategy where an investor buys a stock just 
before the ex-dividend date (cum-dividend) and sell it right after the dividend is paid out in 
order to capture the dividend (Blau et al., 2011). This is in notion with results from Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (1986) that showed abnormal positive returns on stocks before the ex-dividend 
date with negative abnormal returns after dividend payment. Dividend capture traders are 
primarily looking for the dividend payment and will create excess demand for stocks before 
the ex-dividend date.  
This pattern provides an opportunity for short sellers to short stocks just before and after the 
ex-dividend date to create a profit, since stocks have abnormal negative returns after the ex-
dividend date. We expect this pattern to be larger for stocks that pay a higher dividend 
compared to stocks with lower dividend yields. Stocks with higher dividend yield will 
presumably have a higher amount of dividend capture trading, creating larger excess demand 
and consequently pushing the price over the fundamental value. The result is larger negative 
abnormal return after the ex-dividend date that short-sellers can profit from.   
2.5 Litterature review: Trading activity around ex-dividend 
date 
While cum-cum and cum-ex trading has gained attention in the media over the last few years 
there is not a lot of research on the topic. Most of the coverage on short-selling and trading 
volumes around ex-dividend dates are centered around dividend capture trading or stock price 
changes and not directly related to cum-cum or cum-ex. The research is still relevant for our 
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thesis as it seeks to explain why volume increases (both short-selling and trading volumes) 
around ex-dividend dates.  
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) investigated the trading volume around the ex-date from 
1970 until 1980 for 2300 NYSE and AMEX5 companies. They found that there was a 
difference in trading volume when it comes to taxable and non-taxable distributions. They 
found significantly increased trading volume around ex-dividend day for taxable distributions 
such as cash dividends. For non-taxable distributions, such as stock splits or stock dividends, 
the trading volume was abnormally negative around dividend days. This shows that many 
investors behave in tax-motivated manner around ex-dividend dates. Following, the trading 
volume increased for stocks with higher dividend yields. This can be attributed to transaction 
costs. If transaction costs are the same, a higher dividend yield will be relatively more 
impactful for investors to trade around. This insight gives us an indication that there should be 
higher trading activity around ex-dividend dates for taxable distributions, as well as for stocks 
with higher dividend yield. If the trading activity is increased for these distributions, we can 
expect short-selling to increase as well, as discussed in section 2.4. Our thesis will therefore 
contribute to the larger thematic of trading activity around ex-dividend date by looking at 
short-selling.  
Blau et al. (2011) looked to investigate whether there was abnormal short selling around the 
ex-dividend date. They found that there was abnormal short-selling on and after ex-dividend 
date. The short-selling was primarily driven by stocks with higher dividend yield. They 
indicate that this could be due to dividend capture investors that drive up excess demand for 
the stock. Short-sellers might recognize this excess demand and position themselves 
accordingly for a fall in the stock after the ex-dividend date. The research gives us an 
interesting insight. As our thesis investigates whether short-selling can be an indication of 
cum-cum/cum-ex trades, it is important to be aware that abnormal short-selling can be due to 
dividend capture trading. We will further contribute to the existing literature by trying to 
isolate the cum-cum effect and use it to calculate potential tax-loss for the Scandinavian 
countries. 
 
 
5 New York Stock Exchange, formerly known as American Stock Exchange  
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2.6 Beneficial ownership and background for event study 
on Denmark 
Securities lending to transfer the ownership for a limited period of time is one of the ways to 
utilize the tax schemes mentioned in the previous section. Not yet mentioned, is that securities 
lending as a way to change the tax duty should not be as effective in theory. Issues identifying 
the real beneficial owner of the stocks complicate the tax reimbursement process where the 
question is whether the lender or borrower is the beneficial owner at the time of the ex-
dividend date. This is important because it determines what the marginal tax on the dividend 
should be. We will not elaborate in detail about this, but instead give a brief overview on the 
topic and explain the problems it causes. As the borrower has full rights over the shares at the 
time of the dividend, one can assume that the borrower is the beneficial owner as well, but this 
is not straight forward. Short-selling is a time limited transaction and the real owner of the 
shares can therefore be argued to be the lender and should consequently be regarded as the 
beneficial owner. The implication is that the withholding tax will be set to the rate of the lender 
instead of the borrower, which contradicts the intention of the tax-motivated trader. 
While the it can be very clear in some circumstances, the distinction can become blurred for 
the government agencies that receive the application for refund of withholding tax. Under the 
current system it is hard for tax authorities to identify the real beneficial owner. Data from 
Norway shows that foreign investors own more than 40 percent of the stocks on Oslo Stock 
Exchange and that many of these investors own their shares through nominee accounts that 
disguise the identity of the owners (DN, 2019). The beneficial owner issue also becomes 
complex when there are multiple chains of transactions. This can include stocks that are short-
sold multiple times or stocks that are on loan with one borrower in addition to a repurchase 
agreement with another.  
A final factor is the timespan of the transaction. If a stock is on loan for a long time, it can be 
argued that the borrower is the beneficial owner at the time of the dividend. A shorter loan 
timespan can count in favor of the lender being the real beneficial owner. If a stock is on loan 
for a very short period around the ex-dividend date, the reason for the loan is possibly tax-
motivated, as the borrower is not exposed to price-risk to the same extent as in a longer loan 
period. In 2016, Germany introduced a draft that required the owner of shares to hold the 
shares for minimum 45 days before and after the dividend, to apply for a tax credit. In addition, 
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the shareholder must bear a risk of change in value of 30% during the period (EY, 2016). The 
intention of the draft was to shut down cum-cum transactions. 
The ministry of trade, industry and fisheries in Norway has now proposed that all publicly 
traded companies and limited liability companies (AS) must inform who their owners are, 
including owners through nominee accounts. Denmark has, as a preventive action to reduce 
tax avoidance, introduced additional documentation requirements regarding beneficial 
ownership since 2016 (Skat.dk, 2019). In August 2015, Denmark stopped paying out refunds 
on withholding tax in light of the scandal that was revealed in Germany, however, they 
resumed reimbursement on dividend tax 17 March 2016 (Skat.dk, 2019). Our thesis identifies 
if this has led to any significant change in the short-selling pattern around ex-dividend date, 
and we will investigate this further in the analysis section by conducting an event study. We 
distinguish between post and pre period using an event date6. To get a better view of how the 
tax authorities work when trying to prevent the occurrence of tax evasion, we conducted an 
interview with the Danish researcher Emma Blicher. The goal was to get a better view of the 
situation from someone who has done a lot of research on the topic as well as worked closely 
with Christoph Spengel, often considered one of the most knowledgeable persons on the topic. 
Blicher stated that the Danish tax authorities does not have the capacity to follow up and 
identify the beneficial owner of the stocks. According to Blicher there is also, to some degree, 
lack of incentives from the Danish tax authorities. It can be stated that they do not want to 
implement regulations that would eradicate cum-cum transactions completely, as that would 
lead to reduced foreign investment which is also not optimal for the Danish economy. The 
impact these regulations have had on the short sale will be further investigated in the analysis 
section.  
 
 
 
6 The event date is the date when Danish tax authorities they resumed reimbursement on dividend tax,  17.03.2016. For 
simplicity purposes, we will hereafter refer to this day as the ‘event date’. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Data collection 
The short data used throughout the thesis was given to us by Sparebank 1 Markets and is for 
the time period 09.04.2013 to 15.11.2019. The data included the short interest as a percentage 
of free float7 for stocks in the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark). The 
stocks that we have data on is based on different indices in the different countries. The data is 
based on indices that represent the most liquid stocks on the different exchanges; OBX in 
Norway, OMX Stockholm 30 in Sweden and OMX Copenhagen 25. We obtain data on trading 
volume from Yahoo Finance8 for the same stocks and for the same period as for the short data 
(Yahoo Finance, 2019). We gathered trading volume data to compare trends in the different 
datasets.  
We start the data management by removing stocks that were deemed not suitable for the 
analysis. A full list over stocks removed as well as reason for removal is found in Appendix 
8.1. Stocks that did not pay a dividend in the time period were kept but omitted from the 
analysis. The stocks could have served as a control group, but since we had very few stocks 
that did not pay a dividend, we chose to use a different methodology without the stocks. To 
perform several regressions as a part of our analysis, we needed an integrated dataset including 
the relevant variables. As there is no place to retrieve an integrated dataset including both the 
short percentage over time as well as ex-dividend dates for each stock, this has to be created 
in R to get the desired dataset9. This included creating panel data that gathered the 31-day 
event window based on ex-dividend dates for all the stocks in our dataset.   
 
 
 
7 Free float is the number of shares available in the market. Shares owned by governments, insiders and promoters are 
excluded. 
8Extracted from Yahoo Finance, Historical Prices from 09.04.2013-15.11.2019. 
9 RStudio is used throughout the thesis for preprocessing of data as well as statistical analysis. 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
In the dataset containing short interest ratios, we have a total of 453 dividend distributions 
from 62 companies split by the three countries. Table 2 gives a summary of the number of 
dividend distributions for different countries, as well as the number of stocks per country.   
 
Table 2: Number of stocks and dividend distributions 
Country No. of stocks No. of distributions 
Norway 21 175 
Sweden 27 188 
Denmark 14 90 
Total 62 453 
 
The total number of distributions in Denmark is the lowest of the three countries and the most 
likely reason is that we have fewer Danish stocks in the dataset. We note that the Norwegian 
stocks inhibit close to the same amount of distributions as Sweden even though the amount of 
stocks are different. In our dataset, many of the Swedish stocks pay out only once a year, while 
many Norwegian stocks pay out their dividend two or four times a year. Table 3 shows the 
month that each ex-dividend date occurs in, for all of our stocks. 
 
Table 3: Dividend distribution by month 
Month  Count Percent Cumulative 
January  0 0.00 0.00 
February  37 8.17 8.17 
March  83 18.32 26.49 
April  106 23.40 49.89 
May  124 27.37 77.26 
June  9 1.99 79.25 
July  3 0.66 79.91 
August  33 7.28 87.20 
September  5 1.10 88.30 
October  14 3.09 91.39 
November  31 6.84 98.23 
December  7 1.77 100 
Total  453 100 100 
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We have included the dividend distributions for years 2013 and 2019 where the full year is 
not present. This can give a slightly different annual estimate than what would be normal. 
However, we can conclude that most of the dividends are paid in the period from February to 
May. The two months of April and May alone counts for just above 50 percent of the dividend 
distributions in our dataset. When looking at short-selling around ex-dividend date, we use 15 
days before and after the ex-dividend date. It should therefore be noted that the underlying 
dates in the distributions not necessarily are the same. This can potentially create some 
problems in our dataset where the state of the stock market can influence specific stocks. In 
specific market conditions, some stocks might be shorted more/less than others. Since we have 
data for over six years, and the fact that most distributions are in the same months, we still 
utilize the approach of choosing the time period of 15 days before and after each stock ex-
dividend date. As we later want to study the relation between short ratio and a stock’s dividend 
yield, we have included some dividend features in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Dividend features 
Dividend yield Value 
Mean (%) 3.50 
Standard deviation 1.47 
Min (%) 0.55 
Max (%) 6.39 
Dividend yield groups Count 
Low (0-2%) 10 
Medium (2-4%) 31 
High (>4%) 21 
Total 62 
  
 
Approximately a third of the stocks in the dataset pay a dividend of 4 percent or more. Half of 
the stocks pay a yield between 2-4 percent, and the remaining pay a dividend yield below 2 
percent.  
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3.3 Case study: Equinor  
We have chosen to include a case study on Equinor to highlight some of the differences in 
using different datasets as a predictor for short-selling. Equinor is the biggest company in 
Scandinavia in terms of revenue, and typically pays out dividends four times a year (E24, 
2018a). It is interesting to look at Equinor as they have, in the past, paid regular and relatively 
large dividends. Equinor is a state-owned energy company and therefore has the added security 
of being owned by the state. Even though a significant number of their shares is owned by the 
Norwegian state (67%), the float represents a relatively large amount. If we were to calculate 
the free float market capitalization, it would still be among the top 5 stocks in Norway in terms 
of market capitalization10 in 2018. 
As mentioned earlier in section 2.5, previous papers has covered similar topics where the 
trading volume has been used as a proxy to identify the effects of tax-motivated trading. For 
example, an article from DN (2018) calculated the estimated tax loss on Equinor (at the time 
named Statoil) to be around 80 million NOK for 2018. The authors claim that this amount can 
be the potential amount that the Norwegian state loses in tax revenue by this type of tax-
motivated trading in only one year.  
To get a better indication on how the short interest activity behaves in comparison to the 
trading volume, we have conducted a case study to visually examine similarities and 
differences for the Equinor in 2018. If the increase in trading volume was a good indicator for 
tax-motivated trading, we would expect to see some increase in the trading volume around the 
ex-dividend date. Again, we expect to see this due to the tax-motivated trading where an 
investor with a large marginal tax on dividends sell their shares to an investor with a lower 
marginal tax rate on dividends. If we were to observes clear spikes in the trading volume 
around these dates, this could be a good proxy for tax-motivated trading. In Figure 2 below, 
the standardized short ratio and the standardized trading volume is plotted for the year 2018.   
 
10 Float of 1,06 billion shares multiplied with the share price on 31.12.2018 of 183,75 NOK, gives a free float market 
capitalization of approximately 194 billion. 
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Figure 2: Trading volume and short ratio for Equinor 
 
 
 
The dotted vertical lines represent the four dividends that were paid from Equinor during 2018. 
We see that the trading volume is much more volatile compared to the short percentage. This 
is probably due to many stock-specific events, but it looks like the short ratio is very limited 
to the ex-dividend dates in the timeseries. Further, the peaks around ex-dividend date is far 
more evident for the short data timeseries, making this to appear as a better proxy to analyze 
and detect the presence of tax-motivated trading. This will be addressed in a more 
comprehensive matter in the empirical analysis under section 5. 
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4. Methodology 
In this section we will elaborate points from the theoretical framework into the methods we 
want to use in the analysis. First, we present the research questions. Next, we walk the reader 
through the approach we have used, as well as the various aspects of the econometric 
framework that is relevant for our analysis. Lastly, we present our hypotheses related to the 
research questions. With regards to the structure of our analysis, our analysis will be split in 
two parts defined by the research questions below. 
4.1 Research questions  
For the first research question, we want to see if we can isolate the short-selling effect on the 
ex-dividend date. The first research question is therefore worded as follows:  
 
1) Does the short data for the Scandinavian countries, from 2013 till today, show any 
abnormal trading patterns that could indicate tax-motivated trading? 
 
Next we want to take a deeper look at how dividend yield could be linked to the short ratio. 
The second research question is therefore as follows:  
 
2) Does the short data indicate that stocks with a higher dividend yield have more tax-
motivated trading, than stocks with a lower dividend yield? 
 
By answering these research questions, we aim to contribute to existing literature on the topic, 
with emphasis on the Scandinavian countries. We want to shed light on the Scandinavian 
countries subject to tax fraud, and not only Denmark, which primarily have been the 
Scandinavian country gaining most attention with regards to tax fraud. This will be done 
through a tax loss analysis where we study Norway and Sweden in the year 2018.  
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4.2 Research approach  
To answer our research questions, we have used a method where we look at the short ratio 
around the ex-dividend date. This method is based on Blau et. al (2011) where they look at 
short-selling around dividend announcements and ex-dividend dates. They used a 21-day 
window around the events. Our method includes standardization of the short ratio, which also 
is done by Blau et al. and is similar to other research done by Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986), Koski and Scruggs (1998), and Sias (2004). We will elaborate more on why 
standardized short ratio is beneficial in section 4.3.1.  
Further, we have defined regression models to be used in the analysis. In the following section 
we present these models as well as important variables that we later make use of. As an attempt 
to isolate the cum-cum effect, we have conducted an event study that will be described more 
in detail in the following section, as well as looking at how a stock’s dividend yield affects the 
short ratio. Lastly, we conduct a tax loss analysis for Norway and Sweden using the actual 
short ratios (not standardized) to calculate tax revenue lost. This will be further addressed in 
section 4.3.6. 
4.3 Econometric framework 
As mentioned in the former section we have used a methodology similar to Blau et. al (2011) 
where we look at a window of days around each ex-dividend date. We have chosen a 15 day 
window before and after the ex-dividend date as our data is more limited than that of Blau et. 
al (2011). The most important effect that we want to look at is the short-selling pattern around 
ex-dividend dates. In order to isolate the cum-cum effect in our data, we will conduct an event 
study on Denmark, where we study the short ratio before and after Denmark resumed 
reimbursement of dividend tax.   
4.3.1 Standardized short ratio 
To answer both research questions, and to develop relevant regression models, we have used 
the short ratio as a percentage of free float (SRi,t) to define our dependent variable. It is 
shown below in equation (I).  
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𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡– 𝑆𝑅𝑖
𝜎(𝑆𝑅𝑖)
       (I) 
 
The standardized short ratio (SSRi,t) is measured for each stock distribution i on day t. The 
index for days (t) covers a time frame of 31 days; the ex-dividend date, as well as 15 days 
before and after. The average short ratio and the standard deviation (σ(SRi)) for each 
distribution are computed based on the 31-day sample time period for each distribution (i).  
The standardization method we have used is similar to the research mentioned in section 4.2 
and is utilized for an important reason. To aggregate all the stocks within a country, we cannot 
simply use the average of all short ratios across the different stocks. This is due to the fact that 
stocks have different variances in short ratio. That means a higher short ratio for distribution i 
can be relatively significant for stock s, while the same short ratio can be insignificant for 
another stock. This difference in variance can also occur for two different distributions for the 
same stock.  
4.3.2 Panel data analysis – Fixed effects and pooled OLS 
Based on the nature of the data, there are several approaches that can be used when analyzing 
panel data. In the following paragraphs we argue why including fixed effects is not necessary 
for our model and hence a pooled OLS is suitable for the analysis. Next we describe how we 
make use of cluster-robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity across 
observations in our models.  
A potential problem in panel based models is the omitted variable bias. To reduce the problem 
with omitted variable bias, researchers often include fixed effects. This could be to account 
for entity, time or both (Peterson, 2009). In panel data analysis the error term (Ɛi,t) is very 
important, as it determines whether the data contains fixed effects, random effects or both. 
Omitted variable bias occurs when one or more predictor variables that have an impact on the 
model are left out, resulting in biased estimators that again can affect the model’s outcome.  
When including entity fixed effects in the model, it is usually to control for variables that are 
time invariant, resulting in individual heterogeneity. When standardizing the short ratio this is 
already adjusted for, as we subtract the mean from all observations. Hence, we also remove 
time-invariant heterogeneity from the distributions and argue that entity fixed effects are not 
necessary to include in our model.  
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Time fixed effects is included to adjust for effects that changes with time but is invariant on 
entity-level. Since the observations within each dividend distribution are collected around each 
stocks’ respective ex-dividend dates, it will be incorrect to include time fixed effects based on 
the date of the observations. This is because the dividend date varies among the stocks, and 
for instance t = 10 could represent different underlying dates for different distributions. Based 
on the aforementioned discussion, we therefore argue that including time fixed effects are not 
necessary for our defined models, and hence using a pooled OLS is most appropriate for the 
analysis.  
Even though we use standardized short ratio, it is likely that there is some correlation between 
grouped observations (e.g. between two different stocks), and hence it can be necessary to 
look at clustering of standard errors. For our dataset it is therefore a question of what level to 
cluster on; distribution-level, stock-level or country-level. Not adjusting for correlated 
residuals could for example distort the inference of the model by underestimating the standard 
error or yielding too small p-values (Cameron & Miller, 2013). Since clustering at lower 
aggregate levels proposes the potential issue of underestimated standard errors, we disregard 
the option to cluster at distribution-level. As we only have three countries in our dataset, which 
can be considered relatively few, we disregard this option as well. To avoid problems with 
correlated residuals, we therefore cluster the errors on stock-level in our regressions 
(Wooldridge, 2016).  
4.3.3 The abnormal short-selling model 
As tax motivated trading typically involves stock lending around ex-dividend dates, we are 
interested to see if we can observe any significant increase in short-selling volume within a 7-
day window around the ex-dividend date. To observe the effect the 7-day window has on short-
selling, we created a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the observation is within 3 
days before or after ex-dividend date. Our model is defined by equation (II): 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + ℇ𝑖,𝑡     (II) 
 
The dependent variable SSRi,t is the standardized short ratio for dividend distribution i in the 
31-day window. In our equation we have one dummy variable (Ei,t) that capture the effect on 
the seven days in the 31-day window that we are looking at. The binary indicator (Ei,t) takes 
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value 1 when t ∈ [-3, 3] and 0 otherwise. The ex-dividend date is represented as t = 0. This 
dummy variable therefore observe the standardized short ratio increase for the days around 
ex-dividend date. The argument for including days prior to the ex-dividend date, is that the 
beneficial owner of a stock needs to change before ex-dividend date in order to utilize the 
cum-cum tax scheme as mentioned earlier. We expect this to increase the short-selling before 
the ex-dividend date.  
4.3.4 Event study on Denmark – Extension of the model from 4.3.3 
Since we have data before and after the event where the Danish tax authorities stopped and 
resumed refunds on dividend tax, we want to use this to see if there is any change in the short 
ratio. We have chosen to use March 2016 as the event date, even though the dividend payments 
were first put on hold in August 2015. If the documentation requirements were introduced in 
August 2015, it would have made sense to use this date instead. Because the additional 
documentation requirements were not introduced before March 2016, we use this date. This 
means that you would still be able to apply for a refund under the old regulation until March 
2016. Rightful refunds for the period between August 2015 and March 2016 were still 
refunded, but at a later point in time. Because of this, we expect to see the same trading activity 
between August 2015 to March 2016 as before August 2015. Therefore, we have not used this 
period as a dummy variable in our event study. Before the documentation requirements came 
into place in March, the changes were not known and there would be no reason to stop 
investing in a tax-motivated manner. Another contributing factor for not using this time period 
as a counterfactual, is that there are very few observations in this small period of time. We 
include the following extension of our model in equation (III):  
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑃𝑖𝐸𝑖,𝑡   + ℇ𝑖,𝑡     (III) 
 
The variable Pi is a binary indicator to express whether or not the observation is before or after 
the event date. This variable takes the value 1 if the observed value is post event date, and 0 if 
the observed value is before the event date. Hence the binary indicator will contribute to our 
understanding of the change in short-selling after the event date. Pi is multiplied with the ex-
dividend date dummy, giving us the interaction Ei,t * Pi. This interaction term captures the 
difference before and after the regulatory change in Denmark, and we run this for all countries 
together as well as each country separately. 
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4.3.5 Dividend yield model 
The intention of this model is to see if the dividend yield is related to changes in the short 
ratio. By dividing the stocks into different groups based on the dividend yield, this can be used 
in the regression model to see the difference between the yield groups on short sale. For the 
dividend yield, we have used the definition by Blume (1980) to calculate the annualized 
dividend yield. It can be seen in equation (IV) below: 
 
   𝐷𝑠,𝑦  =  
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑠,𝑦
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠,𝑦
              (IV) 
 
The dividend yield is the dividend per share for each stock s paid in year y (𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑠,𝑦) divided 
by the closing price on the last trading day in year y. We have chosen to use the five-year 
average dividend yield to make use of all observations in the dataset. This is simply an 
arithmetic average of the annualized dividend yield, as shown in equation (IV), for the five 
last years. In our case, that would imply using the average dividend yield in the years 2013 to 
2018. Many companies have variable dividend payments over time, but many large stocks 
typically pay relatively the same amount each year. We do recognize that using the five-year 
average dividend yield can potentially create some bias in our estimates as many things can 
influence the dividend yield in the short run. If a stock has a significant drop in the share price 
in one year, this will increase the dividend yield, all other things constant. Additionally, using 
the last trading day in each year to calculate the dividend yield can create bias if there is an 
event that only affects a certain stock or sector. However, there are mechanisms in the stock 
market that will stabilize the dividend yield in the long run. If a company grows their revenue, 
they will in many cases increase their dividend. In this case, one would also expect their share 
price to increase due to positive growth which in turn will keep the dividend yield more 
constant.  
To look at the dividend yield and its influence on short-selling we have chosen to divide the 
companies into three different groups. All companies with a higher dividend yield than 4 
percent are in the high dividend yield group, companies with dividend yield between 2-4 
percent are in the medium group and companies below 2 percent are in the low group. The 
number of stocks in each category can be found in Table 4. To answer if there are any 
differences between the groups, we run the following model as presented in equation (V): 
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𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑗𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  ℇ𝑖,𝑡             (V) 
 
The dependent variable is our standardized short ratio which is the percentage change in short-
selling volume for each day within the 31-day time window. We have included the interaction 
term Di,j * Ei,t to capture the effect the dividend yield has on the short ratio. The variable will 
capture the different groups of dividend yield and their impact on short-selling around the ex-
dividend date, where j=1 is the dummy indicator for stocks with a low dividend yield and j=3 
is the dummy indicator for stocks with a high dividend yield. 
4.3.6 Tax loss model 
In the final part of the analysis, we will look at the potential tax revenue loss for Norway and 
Sweden due to short-selling around ex-dividend dates. The intention is to get a rough estimate 
on the potential tax revenue lost due to tax-motivated trading. The tax-loss for Denmark is not 
calculated as we expect the regulatory changes in 2016 to have reduced the tax-motivated 
trading and therefore we want to focus on Norway and Sweden. In addition, estimates for cum-
cum and cum-ex in Denmark has been calculated by other sources mentioned in the 
introduction of this thesis. We have used the year of 2018 to calculate the tax revenue loss for 
both countries. The method used is straightforward and has been illustrated for Equinor on 
“dark pools” in DN (2018) and in ProPublica (2016) on German companies in the DAX 30.  
Both articles use average trading or short-selling volumes prior to the ex-dividend date and 
subtracts this volume from the volume on ex-dividend date. The excess volume is multiplied 
by the dividend paid, and then reduced to 15 percent of the amount. The 15 percent is the tax-
rate that would normally be taxed if investors do not find ways to save tax using trading 
schemes, such as cum-cum trading. The formula used is shown in equation (VI) below: 
 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠,2018 =  𝐷𝑖𝑣s,2018  ∗ 𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑠,2018 ∗ 15%               (VI) 
 
The variable Divs,2018 represents the dividend payment for each stock in 2018. Variable 
ESRs,2018 represents the excess number of shares that are short-sold on the ex-dividend date for 
each stock. The excess number of shares that are short-sold is calculated by taking the short 
ratio percentage as float on the ex-dividend date, subtracted by the average short ratio 
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percentage float for each stock s for the year of 2018 and multiplied by the share free float to 
get the excess number of shares that are short-sold on the ex-dividend date. Lastly, this amount 
is multiplied with 15 percent to obtain the saved tax.  
As different investors have different marginal tax rates, we will illustrate the loss of tax 
revenue for different marginal tax rates; 5 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent. Tax agreements 
that the Scandinavian countries have with foreign states typically reduce the withholding tax 
to 15 percent and not the general withholding tax rate (some countries have other percentages 
as well). This means that different investors can potentially exploit these differences through 
different tax schemes. We have therefore chosen to look at the tax revenue lost if all investors 
on average reduce their withholding tax by 5, 10 and 15 percent. 
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4.4 Hypotheses 
Before we present our analysis, we formulate two hypotheses related to our research questions. 
For our first research question we have used a regression model to indicate whether the short 
ratio increases around ex-dividend date. Our first hypothesis is therefore as following:  
H1: The short ratio should increase significantly within the 7-day window [-3,3] 
around the ex-dividend date 
As mentioned earlier, it can be several reasons for tax-motivated trading, in which cum-cum 
could be a part of it. It could also be generated by other events such as dividend capture trading, 
as described by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986). Therefore, we include the event study on 
Denmark, and see if that can be used to better isolate the cum-cum effect.  
For our second research question we have used a regression model to indicate whether short-
selling percentage is higher for stock distributions with higher dividend yields. We have 
formulated the second hypothesis as follows:  
H2: The short ratio is higher for stocks with higher dividend yields and short selling 
increases with the dividend yield  
Again, the increased short-selling can also be due to dividend capture trading, and we will 
address this in a more extensive matter in our analysis. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
In this part we present the findings from the models described above. As a brief introduction 
to the analysis, we visualize the differences in trading activity on a country basis. Figure 3 
illustrates the increased short sale around ex-dividend date and is based on the time period 
after Denmark introduced new documentation requirements for refunds on withholding tax in 
March 2016 (post event date). 
5.1 Graphical evidence – Using short data as a proxy 
 Figure 3: Standardized short ratio for the Scandinavian 
countries from 2016-2019 
 
 
The stapled lines in Figure 3 show the dividend window that we have used in further analysis 
and symbolizes the 3-day window around the dividend date. We note that all the three 
 34
countries have a notable increase in the standardized short ratio around ex-dividend date. A 
remark is that Denmark appears to have the lowest increase, which is interesting considering 
that Denmark was exposed to a large amount of cum-ex fraud compared to the other 
Scandinavian countries. In the period of study, Denmark implemented regulatory changes to 
reduce tax-motivated trading, such as regulations on beneficial ownership that was introduced 
in 2016. In the same time period Norway and Sweden have not changed their regulation on 
withholding tax11. Knowing that Denmark is the only country that has done changes to their 
regulations, it is interesting to note that the increased short-sale in Norway and Sweden is 
twice that of Denmark, respectively.  
 
Figure 4: Standardized trading volume for the Scandinavian 
countries from 2016-2019 
 
 
In Figure 4 we have provided a similar illustration using standardized trading volume instead 
of short data. We obtain the standardized trading volume by following the same method as for 
the short data. We note that the abnormal trading pattern is a lot less evident in Figure 4 and 
that the trading volume data is much more volatile compared to the short data. It is possible to 
 
11 Norway has introduced documentation requirements for reduced withholding tax on 01.01.2019 (Skatteetaten, n.d.b). 
Since we do not have data for all of 2019, we have not gone in depth to analyze the effect of these documentation 
requirements, however, it could be interesting to look at for future research on the topic.  
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see from both plots that there is increased trading activity around ex-dividend date, however, 
the pattern is more visible in the short data. Another interesting trend we find in both plots, is 
the fact that Sweden has one of the higher peaks in both, while Denmark’s increased trading 
activity is a lot less evident. It is, however, difficult to say what the exact reason for this is, 
and how much that is related to tax-motivated trading. Lastly, the reader should notice that the 
magnitude of the “spikes” is different in the two plots with larger increased activity in the 
short-selling data. 
5.2 Short volume around ex-dividend date before and after 
event date 
For the first research question we wanted to see if there were significant increase in the short 
ratio around ex-dividend date for the Scandinavian countries. The following regression aims 
to answer two questions: first, whether or not the short data shows increased trading activity 
around ex-dividend date, and next, if the implemented regulation in Denmark has had any 
effect on the short ratio. The regression analysis in Table 5 makes use of the two dummies Ei,t 
and Pi which are described in the methodology section earlier and the notes below Table 5. 
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Table 5: Abnormal short-selling around ex-dividend date [-3, 3] 
 
 All 
(1) 
Norway 
(2) 
Sweden 
(3) 
Denmark 
(4) 
 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 1.322
*** 1.166*** 1.314*** 1.641*** 
 (0.028) (0.046) (0.042) (0.067) 
          
𝑃𝑖  ∗  𝐸𝑖,𝑡 -0.192
*** 0.024 0.071 -1.153*** 
 (0.036) (0.058) (0.052) (0.083) 
     
      
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 14,063 5,445 5,828 2,790 
Distributions 453 175 188 90 
Adjusted R2 0.261 0.252 0.334 0.200 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the standardized short ratio on day t around 
dividend distribution 𝑖. Where t is limited to the 31-day period around the ex-date 
(t ∈ [−15;15]). For regression (2), (3) and (4) a subset of the dataset is used.  𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is 
a binary indicator that is equal to one if the observation is within the cum-cum 
window, that is, if t = [−3, 3]. 𝑃𝑖 is a binary indicator that is equal to zero for 
distributions observed before the tax regulation (March 2016), and one if the 
observed distribution is after that date. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
presented in the parentheses, and (***), (**) and (*), denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. All standard errors are clustered at stock-level to account 
for heteroskedasticity across observations. 
 
Table 5 shows that the variable Ei,t is positive and significant at the 1 percent level suggesting 
that the average short ratio around ex-dividend date is considerably higher than the rest of the 
31-day period in all countries altogether, as well as for each country respectively. This 
confirms our suspicion that there has been increased short-selling around ex-dividend dates 
for the stocks in our model. The largest constant can be found in Denmark while the lowest 
constant is in Norway. This is an interesting finding due to the fact that we know that there 
has been extensive tax-motivated trading and tax fraud in Denmark. Although the variable is 
significant, the model only has an adjusted R2 between 20 and 33 percent2. This gives us an 
indication that there are other factors that can influence the short percentage.  
The variable Pi that indicate whether or not we are before or after the event date, is multiplied 
with the ex-dividend date dummy, giving us the interaction term Ei,t * Pi. This interaction term 
captures the difference before and after the regulatory change in Denmark, and we run this for 
all countries together as well as each country separately. Although Norway and Sweden have 
not made any changes to their regulations in the time period, there could have been other 
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factors that influenced the short-selling for all the countries combined. One explanation could 
be that short-selling in all the Scandinavian countries decreased after cum-ex and cum-cum 
trading was exposed in Denmark. Table 5 further shows that interaction term Ei,t * Pi is 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level in the regression with all the countries and for 
the regression with Denmark. We cannot find that the interaction term Ei,t * Pi for Norway and 
Sweden is significant, but we can see that the constant is positive. This is another interesting 
finding. We can see that short-selling in the post-period in Denmark seems to have been 
reduced drastically as the interaction term is negative and significant, while short-selling in 
Norway and Sweden has not changed significantly. This is in line with our expectations that 
the regulatory changes in Denmark has affected the short-selling volumes.  
As written in the article by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), the increased short-selling 
before ex-dividend date could be due to short-sellers positioning for dividend capture traders 
that drive prices above their fundamental value. However, it is strange that the short interest 
should increases by a large amount before the ex-dividend date, if the argument is that prices 
go up as investors want to capture the dividend. If that was the main motivation, it would be 
reasonable to think that short sale would only increase just prior to the ex-dividend date, which 
our graphs prove not to be the case. On the other hand, if investors are trying to position 
themselves with large short positions before ex-dividend date, they might have to do this 
earlier to obtain the short-position at a reasonable price. This is, however, only speculation, 
but if the motive is to benefit from negative stock price returns after the ex-dividend date, the 
investor should not short a stock long prior to the ex-dividend date for optimal returns (as 
stock prices increases due to excess demand by dividend capture traders). This creates room 
to believe that there are other factors that are driving the short ratio up before the ex-dividend 
date, such as tax-motivated trading. 
The ideal scenario for an investor that is short-selling a stock based on other investors that are 
dividend capture trading, would be to short the stock right before the ex-dividend date. If 
enough investors do the same, the price for shorting will be higher and it would therefore be 
logical to think that investors might try to position themselves into the short trade earlier and 
earlier. An equilibrium will be formed where the cost of shorting will equal the gain from 
shorting, assuming that stock has the same price formations before ex-dividend dates. As this 
assumption is not true, the days that investors have to start selling stocks short will fluctuate 
from distribution to distribution and from stock to stock.  
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5.3 Dividend yield model 
As we have indications from the abnormal short-selling model that there are other factors 
influencing the short ratio, we wanted to check if dividend yield influences the short-selling. 
As mentioned earlier, our hypothesis is that a higher dividend yield will result in higher short-
selling around the ex-dividend date. This is because a higher dividend yield gives a higher 
benefit relative to the transaction costs. We assume here that transaction costs do not increase 
with dividend yield.  
To make use of most of the data, and due to the fact that Denmark has made changes to refunds 
of withholding tax, we have performed two regressions; one with all three countries and one 
without Denmark. The output from the regressions for the dividend yield model are shown 
below in Table 6. The regressions are based on short data from 2013 to 2019. 
Table 6: Short-selling significance in different yield groups 
(2013-2019) 
 
 All 
(5) 
Without Denmark 
(6) 
 
𝐷𝑖,1* 𝐸𝑖,𝑡       (Low yield) 1.064
*** 1.180*** 
 (0.145) (0.247) 
𝐷𝑖,2* 𝐸𝑖,𝑡       (Medium yield) 1.092
*** 1.173*** 
 (0.066) (0.072) 
𝐷𝑖,3* 𝐸𝑖,𝑡       (High yield) 1.392
*** 1.400*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) 
 
Estimation method OLS OLS 
Observations 14,063 11,273 
Distributions 453 363 
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.295 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the standardized short ratio on day t 
around dividend distribution 𝑖. Where t is limited to the 31-day period 
around the ex-date (t ∈ [−15;15]). 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is a binary indicator that is equal 
to one if the observation is within the cum-cum window, that is, if t = 
[−3, 3]. Di,j is a variable that indicates what yield group a stock is in where 
j = [1, 3]. Cluster-robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses, 
and (***), (**) and (*), denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. All standard errors are clustered at stock-level to account for 
heteroskedasticity across observations.   
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In Table 6, the variable Di,j represents the different dividend yield groups. The index j can 
take the values [1, 3], each representing a specific yield group12. We observe from the 
regression that both high yield and the interaction between high yield and the trading window 
is highly significant. We can see that the same applies to the low yield and medium yield 
interaction term, they are all significant at the 1 percent level. If we look at the constants of 
the different interaction terms in the regression with all countries, we can see that the 
difference between low and medium is much smaller than the difference between medium and 
high yield. We do observe that the constant increases with yield in the regression with all 
countries.  
For the regression where Denmark is excluded the short-selling around the ex-dividend is 
significant at the 1 percent level for all yield groups. An interesting notion is that the constant 
for low yield is 0,007 higher than the medium yield, signaling that the difference in short-
selling is smaller in the low and medium dividend yield categories. We note that the highest 
constant is found in the high dividend yield category. This is true for both regressions.  
The results can be said to be mixed. The short ratio increases for all yield categories around 
the dividend date, which in turn can be said to be as expected. On the other hand, we cannot 
observe a clear increase in short-selling with dividend yield. The difference between the low 
and medium yield category is relatively modest and in the regression without Denmark, the 
low yield category is higher than the medium yield group, contrary to our belief. Finally, we 
can see that the constant for high yield is the highest among the yield categories in both 
regressions. This can be said to be as expected since the literature on dividend capture trading 
explains that there is more reason to do this type of trade when transaction cost relative to 
dividend amount is as low as possible. In a cum-cum trade scheme the bank that helps facilitate 
the short-selling scheme will charge a security lending fee for the transaction. If this security 
lending fee is constant, it will be more profitable to utilize cum-cum trading schemes when 
dividend yield and the saved tax is high. 
 
 
12 The index j for the yield group variable Di,j  can take the three values 1, 2 or 3, each number representing the categories 
low, medium and high, respectively.  
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5.4 Country-specific analysis and tax loss estimation 
5.4.1 Short-selling in Denmark 
As Table 5 showed that the short-selling volume was significantly lower in the post-period 
(after 2016), we have showcased Denmark in more detail. As explained in section 4.3.4, 
Denmark put all payments of refunding of withholding tax from August 2015 to March 2016 
on hold, in which they later returned to paying refunds. Since additional requirements for 
refunds were not introduced before March 2016, this is our event date. Refunds between 
August 2015 and March 2016 were processed at a later stage, after first being put on hold. In 
Figure 5 we can see the changes in short-selling around the ex-dividend date before and after 
March 2016. From 2013-2016 the short-selling on the ex-dividend date was close to 2 percent 
on average and from 2016-2019 the same number is closer to 0,6 percent. 
 
Figure 5: Short-selling in Denmark before and after regulation 
(March 2016) 
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As Denmark has different laws on dividend withholding tax than other Scandinavian countries, 
we cannot compare them directly but we know that the cum-ex scheme was utilized in 
Denmark together with cum-cum similar schemes with foreign funds, by transferring the 
shares before the ex-dividend date to save tax (DR, 2018b). 
Even though we cannot with certainty say that the reduction in the short ratio is solely due to 
tax-motivated trading, multiple indications point in that direction. An interview conducted 
with the Danish researcher at Copenhagen Business School, Emma Blicher gave us insight 
into how the Danish tax authority work and could tell us that they had little to no extra capacity 
to process requests for tax refund where the beneficial owner needed to be identified. An article 
by the New York Times (2018) notes the same information, that the tiny department at the 
Danish tax office responsible for refunding withholding tax, was run by one man that approved 
thousands of applications without having the tools to check if the refunds were correct. After 
2016, more attention has been given to the tax authorities and it is apparent to believe that this 
has reduced the tax-motivated trading.  
There could also be other reasons for the decrease in the short ratio. Stricter documentation 
requirements for short-selling (specifically refund of withholding tax) could have made it less 
attractive for foreign investors to invest in Danish stocks. Lawful investors could have 
decreased their trading activities in Denmark when refunds were halted and stayed out of the 
markets. This could have created less liquidity in the markets and created less room for short-
selling. A plausible explanation of the sharp drop in the short ratio could also be a combination 
of the explanations. That some of the fall is due to tax-motivated trading and that the rest of 
the decrease can be attributed Denmark as a less attractive country to invest for foreign 
investors.   
5.4.2 Short-selling in Norway and Sweden 
Similar to Figure 5, the short-selling plots for Norway and Sweden can be found in Figure 6 
and Figure 7. The plots contain the average short ratio around the ex-dividend date for said 
countries. These countries have not implemented similar tax regulation as Denmark during the 
period of study, however, the plots are included for comparison reasons. Even though we did 
not expect to see changes in short-selling in Norway and Sweden due to the regulatory changes 
in Denmark, there could have been other factors that have influenced the short-selling in the 
same time period. One explanation could be that tax-motivated trading in the Scandinavian 
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countries all went down due to the publicity and attention that the reveal of the cum-cum and 
cum-ex schemes. From plotting Norway and Sweden on the same time period, we can rule out 
this explanation. 
 
 
Figure 6: Short-selling in Norway before and after regulation  
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Figure 7: Short-selling in Sweden before and after regulation 
 
 
We can see a clear spike in the short ratio around dividend date for Norway and Sweden as 
mentioned in the graphical evidence in section 5.1. As expected, neither Norway nor Sweden 
have had any drastic changes in the short ratio after the event date. This supports our findings 
presented in Table 5, where Denmark was the only country having a strong significant 
decrease. Even though both Norway and Sweden show a slight increase in short-selling post 
event date, we cannot say that increase is significant based on the regression results presented 
in Table 5. By the plots of Norway and Sweden it is apparent to believe that there is tax-
motivated trading around the ex-dividend date and that these patterns are still fruitful after 
2016. 
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5.4.3 Tax loss estimation 
In the following paragraphs we present the estimation of the tax loss for Norway and Sweden 
in 2018. The estimation of the revenue tax loss cannot be regarded as any conclusive number 
due to the disguised nature of tax-motivated trading but a best estimate is calculating using the 
method shown in section 4.3.6.  The tax revenue loss for Norway and Sweden with 3 different 
tax rates is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Tax revenue lost with different marginal tax rates 
 
Marginal tax rate (%) 5 10 15 
Loss Norway (NOK) 225 295 549 450 591 097 675 886 646 
Loss Sweden (SEK)  251 430 101 502 860 203 754 290 304 
Notes: The marginal tax rate represents different marginal tax rates saved 
by investors           
 
If all the excess short selling on the ex-dividend date is cum-cum transactions where the 
investor manages to reduce their tax rate from 15 percent to a tax-free dividend, the tax loss 
revenue that is lost for Norway would be above NOK 675 million. For the four largest stocks 
in terms of market capitalization, the amount is  almost 478 million NOK in lost tax revenue 
if all the short-selling is cum-cum transaction where the investor gets their dividends tax-free 
(and their original marginal tax rate was 15 percent). The full tax revenue lost for each stock 
can be found in Appendix 8.2. 
For Sweden, the numbers are similar. The annual tax revenue lost if all investors reduce their 
withholding tax from 15 percent to zero is above SEK 754 million. The four largest stocks 
account for about SEK 150 million. The numbers are shown in Table 7 and the full tax revenue 
lost is in Appendix 8.3. 
As this is a very simplified way of calculating the tax revenue loss by short-selling we need to 
repeat that a part of the short-selling around ex-dividend dates will probably be due to dividend 
capture trading or other factors that we have not calculated for in the tax loss analysis. As we 
saw in section 5.1, Denmark had an average standardized short ratio increase from 2016-2019 
on the ex-dividend date of about 0,6 percent. The equivalent number for Norway and Sweden 
is 1,3 percent and 1,6 percent, respectively. The short-selling increase around ex-dividend date 
is therefore more than twice the magnitude for Norway and Sweden compared to Denmark. If 
we were to assume that cum-cum transactions in Denmark have halted and that dividend 
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capture trading and other factors are equal in all three countries, the short-selling above 
Denmark’s 0,6 percent in Norway and Sweden could be cum-cum transactions. The estimated 
tax revenue loss would in that case be a bit smaller than our estimation but could potentially 
be in the hundreds of millions in terms of revenue lost (in NOK/SEK). The closest we can 
come to confirming to what degree tax-motivated trading happens is by evaluating different 
sources in addition to our data material. A former leader in SEB describes in an interview that 
cum-cum trades is the “international standard” and that SEB bank helped their clients with 
saving tax by transferring their shares from abroad to their bank (SVT, 2018). He further 
explains that cum-cum transactions in Germany was halted after 2015, but that these types of 
transactions are happening in many countries up to this date. This way of operating is similar 
to the approach that we explained earlier in section 2.2.1. 
Our dataset does not contain all stocks in Scandinavian countries and only looks at the short-
selling that is attributed to the stocks in our dataset, making the potential estimate larger. In 
addition to this, other forms of tax-motivated trading that does not involve short-selling, can 
be utilized to change the beneficial ownership status before the ex-dividend date. This can be 
through TRS-agreements mentioned earlier.  
A final remark in this chapter would be to remind the reader about the problem of beneficial 
ownership that is a benefactor to this problem. If the status of the beneficial owner of shares 
in lending and TRS agreements were to be fully known, regulators could be more efficient in 
stopping cum-cum and other purely tax-motivated trades. We have seen more attention being 
brought to make markets more transparent and stakeholders advocating for the same thing. 
One example is that the state pension fund of Japan announced that they would stop lending 
out their shares (Financial Times, 2019). One of their main arguments was that there is lack 
of transparency, they do not know who the real borrower is and for what purpose borrowers 
engage in these types of trades.  
One of the challenges that arise to regulators is keeping their country attractive to investors, 
but at the same time, optimizing the tax revenue from investing activities. Investors that want 
to remain unknown for whatever reason, can change their investments to a different country 
(with different regulations) if regulators create an unattractive investment opportunity in their 
home country. It is therefore reason to believe that the changes in regulations that is needed to 
stop cum-cum schemes should happen through international cooperation between legislations.  
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5.5 Limitations 
As mentioned continuously throughout the thesis, the biggest limitation to the analysis is the 
level of accuracy when isolating the cum-cum effect. There are several other venues in which 
cum-cum transaction can take place which we have not covered in the thesis. Many of these 
are less transparent and make it difficult to obtain a precise estimate on the amount of the total 
short percentage that actually is due to cum-cum. Throughout the thesis we have mentioned 
some of them, which are: private repurchase agreements and TRS agreements. It should be 
noted that despite being a weakness in terms of obtaining a precise estimate, it strengthens our 
analysis in the sense that our results could be deemed modest.  
When calculating the five-year average dividend yield, we argue that using the five-year 
average dividend yield is suitable based on the stocks we have in our dataset. However, it is 
still possible that the variable contains some bias as it is possible that the dividend yield 
changes from one year to another. Another weakness of our analysis is the fact that we have 
some imbalanced data. For example, do we have relatively few observations for Denmark 
compared to the other countries, at the same time as Denmark could be seen as the most crucial 
part of our analysis. The same imbalance applies for the number of distributions before and 
after the event date, where we have considerably less distributions before the event date. 
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6. Conclusion and recommendations  
The main goal of the thesis was to identify whether tax-motivated is prominent in the 
Scandinavian countries. We therefore defined regression models to analyze our research 
questions and hypothesis. Earlier in the thesis we formulated the two following hypotheses:   
H1: The short ratio should increase significantly within the 7-day window [-3,3] 
around the ex-dividend date 
H2: The short ratio is higher for stocks with higher dividend yields and short selling 
increases with the dividend yield  
For the first hypothesis, we have proven that there is a significant increase in the short sale 
around ex-dividend date, but we cannot with certainty say that this is solely due to cum-cum 
trading. When visualizing the Scandinavian countries, Denmark seems to have a less 
prominent peak around ex-dividend date, which fits well with the assumption that the new tax 
legislation introduced made this kind of trading activity harder after the event date (March 
2016).  
For the second hypothesis, we showed that stocks within the highest dividend yield group 
seems to have the highest increase in short-selling among the three groups. This is interesting 
findings suggesting that an increase in the tax-motivated trading around ex-dividend date is 
largest for stocks within the highest dividend yield group. However, we cannot conclude that 
dividend yield increases with short-selling, only that short-selling is highest for the high 
dividend yield group. It should, however, be stated that this does not be solely due to cum-
cum/cum-ex trading but could also be due to other kinds of trading strategies such as dividend 
capturing.  
Lastly, we conducted a tax-loss analysis to provide an estimate on how much money that has 
been lost due to tax-motivated trading in the Scandinavian countries. Here we estimate a 
potential tax loss of up to 675 million NOK for Norway and 754 million SEK for the year of 
2018. 
Even though cum-cum trading is not directly illegal, it is definitely a loophole that circumvent 
the intention of the dividend tax legislations. It is therefore reasonable to believe that every 
country wants to reduce the amount of tax lost to these kinds of financial activities and make 
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legislations accordingly. We have already seen that Denmark has taken preventive actions, 
which according to our event study seemed to reduce the tax-motivated trading significantly.   
Legislators in other countries should make notice of the tax-motivated trading schemes that 
have been discovered in European countries such as Germany and Denmark. The major issue, 
as we see it, is the ability for investors to hide under nominee accounts and other forms that 
disguise their identify. This makes it hard for tax authorities to identify who the real owners 
of a stock are and what their tax duty is. If transnational cooperation can seek to make these 
types of transactions more transparent, it would be easier for tax authorities to create fair and 
precise legislation to combat tax fraud and tax avoidance such as cum-cum and cum-ex 
transactions. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Stocks removed from the dataset  
Table 8: Stocks not used in analysis 
Norway Sweden Denmark 
Stock Action Stock Action Stock Action 
NAS No dividend Atcoa B Class shares BAVA No dividend 
BWO No dividend NDA Lack of data GEN No dividend 
NEL No dividend AMEA S Lack of data NKT No dividend 
    MAERSK A Class shares 
    NETS Lack of data 
Notes: The stocks are symbolized by their ticker symbol. The stocks with no dividend were kept 
in the dataset but not utilized. For stocks that have multiple share classes, we only kept the most 
liquid. Some stocks were removed due to no short data or large periods without data.  
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8.2 Tax-loss for each stock in Norway  
Table 9: Tax loss for each stock in Norway 
Stocks in Norway Total dividend 
2018 (NOK)  
Excess number of 
shares on loan (1) 
Lost revenue 
(NOK) 
Equinor ASA  7,49 106572154 119 745 005 
Telenor ASA  12,50 90604128 169 882 739 
DNB ASA 7,10 129964430 138 412 118 
Mowi ASA 10,40 32002056 49 923 207 
Yara International ASA  6,50 23432868 22 847 046 
Norsk Hydro ASA  1,75 160430736 42 113 068 
Aker BP ASA  10,02 679750 1 021 297 
Orkla ASA  2,60 65044101 25 367 199 
Gjensidige Forsikring ASA  7,10 59312255 63 167 551 
Schibsted ASA  1,75 2524650 662 721 
SalMar ASA  19,00 6300896 17 957 553 
Leroy Seafood Group ASA 1,50 10665992 2 399 848 
Aker ASA  18,00 66905 180 644 
Storebrand ASA  2,50 51363397 19 261 274 
Tomra Systems ASA 2,35 0 - 
Subsea 7 SA  5,00 0 - 
TGS NOPEC Geophysical 
Company ASA  6,49 
2254213 
2 194 476 
P/F Bakkafrost  13,52 370356 750 899 
Elkem ASA  - 0 - 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd 3,72 0 - 
PGS ASA  - 0 - 
Notes: The tax loss analysis is done for the year of 2018. The total dividend is the dividend 
paid by the company in 2018. The lost revenue is calculated by multiplying the total dividend 
in 2018 with the excess number of shares on loan and the reduced tax rate of 15%.  
(1) The excess number of shares is calculated by the short ratio for stock i on the ex-dividend 
subtracted from the average short ratio for the year 2018 for each stock.  If the average short 
ratio for a stock is higher on average than on the ex-dividend date, the excess number of 
shares on loan is set to 0. 
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8.3 Tax-loss for each stock in Sweden 
Table 10: Tax loss for each stock in Sweden 
Stocks in Sweden Total dividend 
2018 (SEK)  
Excess number of shares 
on loan (1) Lost revenue (SEK)  
AstraZeneca PLC  22,86 747375 2 562 749 
Abb Ltd  6,85 0 - 
Volvo AB  4,25 143144655 91 254 718 
Investor AB  12,00 31464668 56 636 402 
Telefonaktiebolaget 
LM Ericsson  1,00 
223258434 
33 488 765 
Atlas Copco AB  7,00 14362291 15 080 405 
Hennes & Mauritz AB  9,75 0 - 
Swedbank AB  13,00 77873671 151 853 657 
Svenska 
Handelsbanken AB  5,50 
124798070 
102 958 407 
Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken AB  5,75 
78500300 
67 706 509 
Telia Company AB  2,30 175865080 60 673 452 
Assa Abloy AB  3,30 5163953 2 556 157 
Sandvik AB  3,50 38630183 20 280 846 
Alfa Laval AB  4,25 17021732 10 851 354 
Tele2 AB  4,00 22948833 13 769 300 
AB Skf  5,50 7003954 5 778 262 
Swedish Match AB  9,20 13228615 18 255 89 
Kinnevik AB  8,25 10812203 13 380 101 
Skanska AB  8,25 23456010 29 026 813 
Autoliv Inc  2,46 0 - 
Electrolux AB  8,30 17363977 21 618 151 
Boliden AB  14,00 10318416 21 668 673 
Securitas AB  4,00 6209780 3 725 868 
Svenska Cellulosa 
SCA AB  1,50 
46377675 
10 434 977 
SSAB AB  1,00 4861657 729 249 
Getinge AB 1,50 0 - 
Notes: The tax loss analysis is done for the year of 2018. The total dividend is the dividend paid 
by the company in 2018. The lost revenue is calculated by multiplying the total dividend in 2018 
with the excess number of shares on loan and the reduced tax rate of 15%.  
(1) The excess number of shares is calculated by the short ratio for stock i on the ex-dividend 
subtracted from the average short ratio for the year 2018 for each stock.  If the average short ratio 
for a stock is higher on average than on the ex-dividend date, the excess number of shares on loan 
is set to 0. 
  
